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Abstract 
The China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is set to become a formidable 
development programme and its implications will be far reaching for East Asia, 
including ASEAN and China. It will provide further momentum for intra-Asian 
investment and trade ﬂows and the implementation of such a strategy will also 
help to accelerate China's mergers and acquisitions activities in infrastructure, 
logistics and tourism. The BRI is expected to raise the Renminbi's international 
use in trade settlement and ﬁnancing. A considerable amount of ﬁnancing is 
estimated to come from Chinese institutions, particularly policy banks such as 
China Development Bank and a range of government-linked institutions. This 
article discusses China's funding support and investment to improve regional 
connectivity and analyses the repercussions of China's ﬁnancial commitments 
under the Belt and Road Initiative for East Asia as well as its own economy. 
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Introduction 
The Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation was held 
in Beijing on 14-15 May 2017. It was attended by more than a thousand 
delegates from over 130 countries and international organizations. Chi-
na's President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech1 and outlined action 
plans to stimulate investment and trade in the Belt and Road economic 
corridors.2 As part of China's renewed support for the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI),3 China will scale up funding support by contributing an 
additional RMB 100 billion to the Silk Road Fund, encouraging overseas 
Renminbi (RMB) fund business, and setting aside a total of RMB380 bil-
lion additional lending to fund infrastructure projects in the region. 
Further, China calls for enhanced policy cooperation to offer long-
term, sustainable ﬁnancial support to facilitate the BRI. It signed busi-
ness and trade cooperation agreements with more than thirty countries 
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at the inaugural forum, as well as memoranda of understanding with 
a dozen multilateral ﬁnancial organisations, including the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB), World Bank and New Development 
Bank (NDB). These efforts are building blocks that will help create a 
China-led global development framework. 
By linking countries and regions that account for about 60 per cent of 
the world's population and 30 per cent of global trade, President Xi Jin-
ping has billed the BRI as a 'project of the century' to integrate the Chinese 
economy with the development of Asia, Europe, Africa and beyond. As 
shown in Table 1, China and the Belt and Road countries are an economic 
force to be reckoned with; their combined sizes are equivalent or even 
larger than some of the existing trade blocs. For comparison purposes, 
while the BRI region is not a trade bloc, its economic size is equivalent to 
that of the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) at 40 per cent of global GDP, 
though with the US' withdrawal, it will be larger than the TPP in terms 
of economic weight. Further, the Belt and Road countries' population 
currently stands at 4.5 billion, which is the largest of the other potential 
trading blocs. This implies that with infrastructure, especially transporta-
tion and communications networks being built up, the BRI will present 
ample opportunities for commercial and people-to-people exchanges.
TABLE 1. Comparison between BRI region and RCEP and TPP 
regions
Indicator TPP
TPP 
(ex-US)
One Belt, 
One 
Road
One Belt, 
One Road 
(except 
China)
RCEP FTAAP
No.  
of economies
12 11 65 64 16 21
Population 
800 mil-
lion
490 mil-
lion
4.5 billion 3.2 billion 3.5 billion 2.9 billion
Nominal GDP 
(US$ trillion)
27.5 9.4 29.8 12.0 22.6 43.8
% of Global 
GDP
40 13 40 16.0 30 60
% Share of 
Global Trade 
26 15 34 22 29 50
Note: RCEP refers to Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. It comprises ASEAN's ten 
members plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. FTAAP refers to 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Paciﬁc and comprise the 21 members of APEC. Sources: IMF, WTO, 
UOB Bank. 
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Chinese investments related to the BRI have totalled US$ 60 billion 
since 2013 and are expected to pick up, with US$ 600-800 billion worth 
of investments planned for the following ﬁve years – equivalent to US$ 
120-130 billion per year over this period.4 Although the amount is large, 
it dwarfs in comparison with the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) es-
timates that Asia Paciﬁc will need to invest US$ 1.7 trillion per year in 
infrastructure from 2016 until 2030 to maintain its growth momentum.5 
The importance of infrastructure to national or regional economic de-
velopment is well documented in several studies (Barro 1990; Futagami 
et al. 1993; World Bank 1994; Canning 1999; Esfahani and Ramirez 2003; 
Canning and Pedroni 2008; Calderón et al. 2015). Whether measured in 
terms of physical stock (for example, road density and telephone lines 
penetration rates) or social aspects (human capital, health services, 
etc.), improving the quantity and quality of infrastructure is vital to 
increasing the productivity and competitiveness of an economy. In a 
regional context, infrastructural connectivity helps facilitate trade and 
investment ﬂows among countries and therefore enhances economic 
integration in the region. 
Due to the crucial role that infrastructure plays in economic devel-
opment and integration, many countries have invested to develop in-
frastructure. However, domestic resources are typically insufﬁcient to 
meet ﬁnancing needs since infrastructure is a long-term investment with 
high up-front capital investment (Henckel and McKibbin 2010; Bank 
for International Settlements 2014).6 Rapid urbanization has also con-
tributed to funding needs in meeting infrastructure demand (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2016).7 The costs of meeting infrastructural needs can 
be monumental (OECD 2015).8 Ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) 
is clearly insufﬁcient to address the huge requirements for infrastruc-
ture while there are ﬁscal and resource constraints (for instance, lack 
of government or public revenue) to plug the infrastructure gap. 
To date, there have been few studies that explore the ﬁnancing 
mechanisms or infrastructure ﬁnancing for the BRI. Most of the litera-
ture surveys the various methods of ﬁnancing infrastructure in general 
(Llanto et al. 2015; OECD 2015;9 ADB 2017), while Bhattacharyay (2012) 
suggests that the existing ﬁnancing mechanisms and instruments, as 
well as institutions in Asia as a whole, are not adequate to meet this 
magnitude and type of infrastructure ﬁnancing need. Bank syndicated 
loans and tax revenue are insufﬁcient to fund infrastructure, while the 
ability of existing institutions such as Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) are limited given the scale of investment needs. Although Asia 
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has many overlapping sub-regional and regional institutions involved 
in national and regional energy, transport, water and telecommunica-
tions infrastructure connectivity projects, the fragmented institutional 
arrangements suggest the need for increased collaboration among such 
international/regional/bilateral infrastructure ﬁnancing institutions to 
address the infrastructure gaps in many developing economies in the 
region (Bhattacharyay and Bhattacharyay 2017).10
This article aims to contribute to the existing literature on infrastruc-
ture ﬁnancing through two key discussions. First, it discusses the vari-
ous ﬁnancing methods under the framework of the BRI initiative and 
examines China's initiatives in the context of the ﬁnancing mechanism 
and institutional architecture. There have been few studies on BRI-re-
lated infrastructure ﬁnancing to date. Second, the article analyses the 
impact on East Asia of China-funded projects under the BRI framework. 
While it may be too early to assess the impact of this ambitious project, 
the BRI has the potential to facilitate deeper regional integration via 
increased trade and investment as well as accelerating China's merg-
ers and acquisitions activities in infrastructure, logistics and tourism. 
However, China's BRI-related support may also bring signiﬁcant risks 
and uncertainty to the Chinese economy, such as the increased burden 
of servicing more debt when cross-country projects become ﬁnancially 
unsustainable due to external geopolitical risks and inadequate risk 
evaluation by Chinese investors. 
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses China's in-
vestment and ﬁnancing efforts to improve regional connectivity, while 
Section 3 analyses the economic impact on the region, particularly 
ASEAN, of China's ﬁnancial commitments under the BRI initiative, 
and for China's own economy. It concludes with a note on policy im-
plications. 
Filling the Infrastructure Gap to Improve Regional 
Connectivity
In 2013, China's President Xi Jinping mooted the idea of a New Silk Road, 
or Maritime Silk Road, that starts from Fujian province and links all the 
littoral countries of the region. Shortly after outlining his new Silk Road 
ideas, Xi Jinping put up the Silk Road Fund of US$ 40 billion that was of-
ﬁcially unveiled at the APEC Summit in Beijing in November 2014. Many 
relevant ministries and departments in China had also worked out action 
plans that were eventually crystallized into the Belt and Road strategy. 
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Infrastructural connectivity remains the key focal point of the BRI. 
Much of the BRI development activity will be initially geared to building 
basic infrastructure and improving physical connectivity. At the inaugu-
ral Belt and Road Forum (BRF) on 14-15 May 2017, China reiterated that 
it will promote investment in key passageways, cities and projects, and 
in connecting networks of highways, railways and sea ports. This will 
lead to strong demand for cross-border ﬁnancing services, with ﬁnancial 
integration as one of the key components aiding the network build-up. 
To facilitate infrastructure investment, President Xi Jinping encouraged 
greater cooperation between government and private capital in building 
a diversiﬁed ﬁnancing system for infrastructure.11 Further, the governor 
of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), Zhou Xiaochuan, stated that the 
funding of the projects related to the BRI should be raised through a 
market-oriented, sustainable and mutually beneﬁcial investment and 
ﬁnancing system.12 As such, mutual efforts from countries involved in 
the BRI are necessary to provide long-term, sustainable funding support 
to meet infrastructure needs. 
A considerable amount of ﬁnancing is estimated to come from Chinese 
institutions, in particular policy banks such as China Development Bank 
(CDB) and a broader array of government-linked institutions (see Ap-
pendix 1). As part of its renewed support for the BRI, the Chinese gov-
ernment plans to scale up funding by contributing an additional RMB 
100 billion to the state-owned Silk Road Fund,13 encouraging overseas 
RMB fund businesses as well as increasing special overseas loans for 
two key development ﬁnancial institutions – the CDB and the Export 
and Import Bank (EXIM) of China – by RMB 250 billion and RMB 130 
billion respectively (Table 2).
In addition to ﬁnancial support for the BRI, China signed a series 
of business and trade cooperation agreements with over 30 countries 
during the BRF. As the BRI is meant to be a mutual cooperation project, 
ﬁnancing is expected to come from various sources, including multilat-
eral agencies such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, as well as private sector 
participation. To enhance policy coordination, China signed a series of 
memoranda of understanding with these multilateral organizations at 
the BRF, leveraging on their strength and expertise in infrastructure to 
further boost investment in the area.14
The ﬁnancial commitments pledged to the BRI underscore the fund-
ing gap with regard to Asia's infrastructure needs. According to the 
ADB, the US$ 1.7 trillion estimate that developing Asia needs to invest 
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TABLE 2. Increased ﬁnancial support from Beijing to BRI
Items Amount
Si lk  Road Fund (addit ional 
injection)
RMB100 billion
Overseas Fund Business in RMB for 
promotion of RMB usage
RMB300 billion
China-Russia Regional Cooperation 
Development Investment Fund 
Initial capital of RMB10 billion; 
total size RMB100 billion
CDB to establish Belt and Road 
(B&R) Multi-currency Special 
Lending Scheme for Infrastructure 
Development  
RMB 100 billion equivalent
CDB to establish B&R Multi- 
currency Special Lending Scheme 
for Industrial Cooperation 
RMB 100 billion equivalent
CDB to establish B&R Multi- 
currency Special Credit Lines for 
Overseas Financial Institutions
RMB 50 billion equivalent
EXIM to set  up B&R Multi- 
currency Special Lending Scheme
RMB 100 billion equivalent
EXIM to set up B&R Multi-currency 
Special Lending Scheme for Infra-
structure Development 
RMB 30 billion equivalent
Increased assistance to developing 
countries along the B&R
At least RMB60 billion from 
2017-2020
Emergency food aid to countries 
along the B&R
RMB2 billion
Replenishment of the South-South 
Cooperation Assistance Fund 
US$1 billion
Source: yidaiyilu.gov.cn
in infrastructure every year is more than double the US$ 750 billion that 
ADB previously estimated in 2009. Infrastructure investment needs vary 
considerably by sector (Figure 1), with power and transport compris-
ing the two largest sectors, accounting for 52 per cent and 35 per cent 
respectively. Among the Asian countries, China, India and Indonesia 
require the most infrastructure investment, with China accounting for 
more than half (58.1 per cent) (Figure 2). Other Belt and Road coun-
tries also need to bridge the infrastructure investment gap since they 
are rapidly urbanizing like China, generating signiﬁcant demand for 
infrastructure. 
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FIGURE 1.  Asian infrastructure demand by sector  
FIGURE 2. Asian infrastructure demand by country 
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While funding availability is an issue, one challenge in developing 
infrastructure in the Belt and Road region is the difﬁculty in identify-
ing investible projects. Only a very small share of global pension and 
insurance funds (10-15 per cent in OECD countries) is invested in infra-
structure projects. Long-term and capital-intensive by nature, a struc-
tured risk-sharing arrangement is therefore crucial for infrastructure 
projects to attract private investors (Ehlers et al. 2014).15 It is expected 
that governments should shoulder risks associated with land acquisi-
tion, environmental clearances and changes in the legal and regulatory 
environment, while the private sector assumes the rest of the market 
risks and undertakes the necessary investment (International Monetary 
Fund 2016). It is important that contracts are based on incentive-driven 
risks and returns (Deutsche Bank Research 2016).16 To channel avail-
able resources into infrastructure ﬁnance, an overall regulatory, legal, 
institutional and ﬁnancing framework is needed to help support ef-
ﬁcient infrastructure project implementation. Conducive regulatory 
frameworks and effective institutions are essential to help mitigate risks 
and attract private sectors to commit large scale, long-term ﬁnancing 
in infrastructure. 
It is well known that given huge infrastructure demand, the ﬁnancing 
requirements would require multiple sources and mechanisms of fund-
ing, such as direct budget investment from ﬁscal resources, borrowing 
and market-based ﬁnancing. A market-oriented, multi-tier system of 
ﬁnancing is the only feasible way to provide sustainable funding for 
cross-border infrastructure projects. This was the key message echoed 
by the PBOC governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, at the recent BRF. Such a 
multi-layered system should include public funding, development 
ﬁnance and private ﬁnancing through both domestic and international 
ﬁnancial markets (Figure 3). 
Public Sector Financing:
- Tax and non-tax revenue;
- Public bond ﬁnancing;
- Development ﬁnance (borrowing from de-
velopment ﬁnancing institutions and 
multilateral development banks)
Infrastructure Finance
FIGURE 3. Possible sources of infrastructure funding
Private Financing:
- Loans from commercial banks;
- Capital market ﬁnancing (corporate 
and project bonds, green bonds);
- Public and private equity 
Source: ADB, author
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Traditionally, the public sector ﬁnances infrastructure through the 
budget appropriation process (through tax revenue) which is common 
to many countries, though there can be constraints on infrastructure 
investment such as ﬁscal rules (i.e. debt or deﬁcit limits). Since domes-
tic resource mobilisation (taxation) can be insufﬁcient, development 
ﬁnance aims to meet funding demands that serve long-term strategic 
objectives. Such lending, which is market-driven, independent and based 
on sound credit analysis, has a longer investment horizon and does not 
rely on subsidies; it focuses on capital preservation and a sustainable 
ﬁnancial model. The public status of development institutions allows 
them to make longer maturity loans at good interest rates, advanta-
geous guarantees and undertake high-risk equity investment to fund 
infrastructure (OECD 2015).17
In China, the CDB and the EXIM Bank of China are two key develop-
ment ﬁnancial institutions that have provided crucial funding support 
for the 'going out' strategy of Chinese state-owned enterprises since 
2008. Equipped with an increased fund allocation from Beijing, the CDB 
and the EXIM Bank of China are expected to increase investment in 
BRI-related infrastructure projects. The CDB has a list of more than 500 
pipeline projects for Belt and Road countries, with planned investment 
totalling US$ 350 billion. EXIM Bank of China has loaned out about US$ 
700 billion for the BRI as of end-2016.18  
China's national development banks are also setting up special invest-
ment funds with foreign governments or sovereign funds to invest in 
strategic development projects. In 2015, EXIM Bank of China and But-
tonwood Investments, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange's 
investment afﬁliate, jointly established the China-Africa Industrial Co-
operation Fund with a total capital of US$ 10 billion. The China-Africa 
Industrial Cooperation Fund has approved six projects totalling US$ 
542 million of investment as of April 2017. For instance, it invested in 
an oil and gas project in Ethiopia, which has become a high-proﬁle BRI 
investment project, involving a total investment of US$ 3.68 billion.19
Further, China set up separate funds with the Middle East, Brazil, 
Eurasia (Central and Eastern European countries and Asia), Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Russia and Kazakhstan for regional invest-
ment cooperation. An investment fund with the European Union is 
under discussion in 2017. The total capital of all China-led international 
investment funds probably exceeded US$ 70 billion as of May 2017 (see 
Table 3). Apart from the China-led AIIB and the New Development 
Bank, China is also working with the European Bank for Reconstruc-
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tion and Development. Working with multilateral development banks 
is a useful way to address the infrastructure gap problem since such 
institutions have in-depth expertise in infrastructure design and im-
plementation tools to make the projects more bankable and attractive 
to private investors. 
As an increasing number of Chinese ﬁrms venture abroad to invest 
in overseas markets, commercial banks are being encouraged to get 
more involved; a wide variety of banking products and services are 
needed, including syndicated ﬁnancing, cross-border settlement and 
TABLE 3. China-led regional development investment funds
Fund Name Time
Key Chinese 
stakeholders
Capital
Investment 
type
China-Eurasia Eco-
nomic Cooperation 
Fund 
Sep-15 EXIM, BOC US$5 billion Equity
China-LatAM and 
Carribbean Industrial 
Cooperation Fund
Sep-15
PBOC, SAFE, 
CDB
US$10 bil-
lion
Debt
China-Africa Indus-
trial Cooperation 
Fund
Dec-15
Buttonwood, 
EXIM
US$10 bil-
lion
Equity and 
debt
China-Kazakhstan 
Industrial Capacity 
Cooperation Fund 
Dec-15 Silk Road Fund US$2 billion
Equity and 
debt
China-UAE Joint 
Investment Fund 
Dec-15 CDB
US$10 bil-
lion
Equity
China-ASEAN  
Investment  
Cooperation Fund 
Nov-14 N/A
US$10 bil-
lion
Equity
China-Africa Devel-
opment Fund 
2006 CDB
US$10 bil-
lion
Equity
Brazil-China  
Cooperation Fund 
Oct-16 CDB
US$20 bn 
(Brazil, 
US$5 bil-
lion, China 
US$15 bil-
lion)
Equity
China-Russia Re-
gional Cooperation 
Development Invest-
ment Fund
May-17 -
RMB100 
billion
Equity
China-EU Joint In-
vestment Fund 
On-going - N/A
Source: Xinhua News, HSBC. Note: 'NA' - not applicable. 
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risk management. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
and Bank of China (BOC) are the leading state banks in the Belt and 
Road expansion. ICBC's BRI-related projects in the pipeline totalled 
US$ 337.2 billion and it has cumulatively provided US$ 67.4 billion for 
212 investment projects. BOC has so far provided credit lines of US$ 68 
billion to 460 BRI projects.20
Beijing is also working with regulators in the Belt and Road coun-
tries to reduce market access barriers and promote an open and fair 
regulatory environment for the international expansion of ﬁnancial 
institutions. For instance, the Silk Road International Bank, initiated 
by three Chinese companies, including Izptec, a big data company, and 
Djibouti's Ministry of Finance, was set up in January 2017 to support 
Chinese enterprises' investment in Africa.21 There are likely to be more 
new ﬁnancial institutions going forward as markets in the Belt and Road 
countries continue to open up. 
From a project ﬁnance perspective, a major requirement of infrastruc-
ture project ﬁnanceability is the availability of sufﬁcient long-term debt 
capital. As such, the capital market can be an efﬁcient way to raise fund-
ing and develop risk-sharing structures, as ﬁnancial instruments such as 
bonds allow for a better diversiﬁcation of risks. However, debt markets 
are much smaller, less liquid and have a narrower investor base in many 
emerging market economies. Efforts to improve the liquidity of local bond 
markets would require the removal of regulatory and tax constraints that 
have impeded the development of secondary trading in private debt 
instruments, as well measures to enhance the attractiveness of local cur-
rency bonds to private investors (Dailami and Leipziger 1998).
Whether through debt or equity ﬁnance, successful fund raising and 
project completion will depend on various factors, such as governance 
standards. Conﬂicting regulations, unclear investment procedures (for 
instance, inefﬁcient procurement policies), the changing tax regime, 
underdeveloped capital market, absence of arbitration facilities and 
weak contract enforcement are all considerable risks faced by private 
investors committing to long-term ﬁnancing in infrastructure (Inderst 
and Stewart 2014). 
The potential for bond ﬁnancing is enormous. In the case of the BRI, 
countries could beneﬁt from China's large and increasingly open bond 
market, which already accounts for 8.7 per cent of the global bond market 
in terms of bonds outstanding. For example, Panda bond issuance (i.e. 
RMB-denominated bonds from a non-Chinese issuer) is expected to ex-
ceed US$ 50 billion by 2020, up from RMB 148 billion (or US$ 22 billion) 
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at the end of 2016.22 In Asia, bond ﬁnancing has outpaced syndicated 
loans in the past ﬁve years and provided more support to infrastructure 
investment, with corporate bonds in China playing a leading role.23 
Silk Road Bonds are becoming an internationally recognized asset 
class, which can be scaled to provide the necessary funding requirements 
for BRI-related infrastructure. Such bonds have gained support from 
government authorities in China and the Belt and Road countries, as 
well as regulatory bodies, multilateral development banks and indus-
trial experts. The International Capital Market Association and Dagong 
Global Credit Rating have set up a Silk Road Bond Working Group in 
Hong Kong to help drive the development of Silk Road bonds. In June 
2015, Bank of China issued the ﬁrst Silk Road Bond totalling US$ 3.55 
billion in four currencies (USD, EUR, SGD and CNY).24 In April 2017, 
it issued another multi-currency Silk Road Bond. 
Reﬂecting a rising global appetite to combat climate change, green 
bond25 issuance has been growing rapidly in the past few years. The 
NDB sold RMB 3 billion (US$ 440 million) of RMB-denominated green 
bonds in China's interbank market on 18 July 2016.26 This was the ﬁrst 
ﬁve-year tenor green bond by a multilateral development bank in China. 
China's green bond issuance exceeded RMB 200 billion in 2016, making 
it the world's largest green bond market due to the policy support from 
the PBOC and the National Development and Reform Commission. 
Regional Spillover and Effect: Sizing up the Impact 
As the BRI was only initiated in 2013, it may be too early to assess 
the likely outcome of the OBOR strategy.  To date, there are very few 
quantitative studies investigating the potential economic impact of this 
ambitious initiative. One study estimated that improving the transport 
network and trade facilitation in countries along the OBOR route could 
raise the GDP growth in Central, West and South Asia ranging from 
0.1 to 0.7 percentage points (Villafuerte, Corong and Zhuang 2016).27 
It also suggested that the PRC would gain a lot from the BRI but some 
countries, such as Mongolia or Pakistan as well as sub-regions such as 
Central Asia and Southeast Asia, stand to beneﬁt signiﬁcantly as well. 
The BRI is set to become a formidable development programme 
and its implications will be far reaching for Asia in the long term. It 
will provide further momentum for intra-Asian investment and trade 
ﬂows and its implementation is expected to accelerate China's mergers 
and acquisitions activities in infrastructure and logistics development. 
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China is not only well-equipped in providing the necessary engineer-
ing skills and construction experiences, it also has an ample supply of 
the necessary machinery and equipment as well as raw materials like 
cement and steel products. China's BRI is thus expected to bolster re-
gional integration between China and ASEAN by developing physical 
infrastructure in the region and deepening regional interconnectivity 
among the countries. Improved infrastructure will increase trade ﬂow 
and volume along the belt, and along with the free trade agreement be-
tween China and ASEAN, give further impetus to economic integration 
between ASEAN and China. A study by Roberts and Deichmann (2011) 
showed that transport and telecommunications infrastructure plays a 
signiﬁcant role in promoting spillovers when it interacts with regional 
trade integration. Hence, China's investment in infrastructure, along 
with its formalized trading agreements with neighbouring countries, 
is expected to promote positive spillovers for the Chinese economy as 
well as that of its ASEAN neighbours.  
In part due to geographic proximity and historic relations with China, 
ASEAN's economic linkages with the mainland via trade, investment 
and tourism have increased signiﬁcantly over the past decade. With its 
emergence as a global manufacturing powerhouse, China plays a crucial 
role in integrating the region's economies; it is home to many regional and 
global production networks which operate to trade parts and components 
in a kind of vertical integration. Accordingly, the ASEAN economies have 
already developed a fairly high level of intra-regional trade with China. 
Figure 4 shows that countries in the region are increasingly integrated 
with China through direct trade expansion. In the last decade or so, 
exports to China have risen as a share of total exports for many ASEAN 
countries, reﬂecting their strengthening trade linkages with China as a 
global manufacturing base. Indeed, the contribution of China to ASEAN's 
export growth has become important in the last few years, accounting 
for about 3 to 7 percentage points of total export growth for Singapore, 
Malaysia and Philippines between 2010 and 2015.
Along with the rise in trade, China's outward direct investment (ODI) 
to ASEAN has also increased over the years, with its share rising to 12 
per cent of its total ODI to Asia in 2015 from 6 per cent in 2003 (Figure 
5). Although, according to UNCTAD data, China's ODI still accounts 
for less than 5 per cent of total inﬂows across ASEAN, this is expected 
to increase in future years under the BRI as the infrastructure invest-
ment boom is likely to lead to tangible increases in the trade of goods 
and services and investment across the region. 
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FIGURE 4. China as a destination for exports, 2001 and 2016 
ASEAN is expected to beneﬁ t as activities pick up in the Belt and 
Road region. Appendix 2 outlines the major BRI projects in selected 
economies. China's BRI efforts have already resulted in some practical 
achievements. Thailand, Laos and Indonesia have joint Belt and Road 
deals with China, mainly in railway construction, while there will be 
a new high-speed rail line running from southern China through Laos 
FIGURE 5. China's outward investment to ASEAN*
* refers to Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam. Source: CEIC.
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to Thailand's industrial eastern coast.28 Further, Beijing has reportedly 
won the contract to build Indonesia's ﬁrst national high-speed rail link: 
a US$ 5.1 billion, 150 km rail project connecting the capital Jakarta to 
Bandung, Indonesia's third-largest city. 
Increasing trade and economic connections implies a greater demand 
for complex ﬁnancial services, such as cash ﬂow management, foreign 
exchange, cross-border payments, and risk and liability management. 
International ﬁnancial centres such as Hong Kong can provide profes-
sional project ﬁnance and risk management services for BRI projects and 
enhance operational efﬁciency and reduce currency risk. Singapore, whose 
infrastructure is already highly developed and does not face a pressing 
funding gap compared to other ASEAN countries, will be an important 
hub for raising and distributing equity and debt capital to facilitate invest-
ment across Southeast Asia. Even without projects in its own backyard, 
Singapore is already beneﬁting from its status as a ﬁnancial hub; the Bank 
of China has reportedly turned to the Singapore bond market to raise US$ 
3.55 billion via a multi-currency bond to support the BRI.29
On the whole, while the BRI is expected to yield positive beneﬁt to 
China and Asia, there are risks and challenges to be watched closely. 
First, given the scale of China's lending to Belt and Road countries for 
infrastructure projects, ﬁnancial risk could increase if projects are not 
well conceived or thoroughly planned. Government subsidies offered 
through policy banks are likely to cause Chinese enterprises participat-
ing in the BRI to underestimate risks and over-stretch their overseas 
investment. According to Fitch, such rapid expansion in overseas infra-
structure lending could create a new set of asset-quality problems for 
the Chinese banking system, potentially worsening China's corporate 
debt problem.30 For instance, China Petrol Zhongda, a state-owned en-
terprise, built a huge oil reﬁnery in Kyrgyzstan, only to discover that it 
could not purchase enough crude oil to run it at more than 6 per cent 
of capacity.31 The construction of the plant or facility has been ridiculed 
and encountered local protests against its environmental impact.  
In addition, the 60-odd countries in the Belt and Road region have a 
very rich mix of political regimes and economic systems. Given that it 
is difﬁcult to run a project in a foreign country with different cultures, 
legal systems, institutions and policies, let alone managing cross-border 
projects running through so many countries with different political 
systems and social beliefs, the ﬁnancial sustainability of cross-country 
projects may be difﬁcult to achieve (Huang Y 2016; Ferrari, Giovannini 
and Massimo 2016). Furthermore, China's export of its surplus steel, 
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cement, aluminium and other construction materials may encounter 
resistance from some countries that fear the move will marginalise do-
mestic producers and workers in these raw material industries. 
Despite the risks and challenges of BRI ﬁ nancing, the initiative brings 
ample opportunities for urbanisation and economic growth. Just as 
importantly, it will have an impact on regional supply chains and 
logistics. The ASEAN economies are expected to beneﬁ t on the whole 
from Chinese-funded projects which will provide further momentum 
for regional investment and trade ﬂ ows. There are indications that new 
supply chains are being crafted between ASEAN and China. Chinese 
ﬁ rms have invested signiﬁ cantly in Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambo-
dia to transfer low value-added manufacturing production, and the 
increasing ability of China to produce sophisticated inputs at home 
implies a reconﬁ guration of supply chain networks in the region. The 
Grubel-Lloyd index, used as a measure to assess levels of integration 
between China and ASEAN in intra-industry trade, suggests there 
has been a shift towards more vertical trade in sectors such as capital 
goods machinery and equipment (i.e. power-generating machinery, 
metalworking and other general industrial machinery) (Figure 6). On 
Source: UN Comtrade. Figures in parentheses denote SITC code. ASEAN -- Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. 
FIGURE 6. Intra-industry indices: China and ASEAN economies
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the contrary, electrical machinery and parts witnessed a decline, sug-
gesting China's increasing ability to produce sophisticated inputs and 
components. With the nascent infrastructure boom in the region and 
ongoing structural changes in China, regional production networks will 
undergo reorganisation and consolidation simultaneously. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Since infrastructural connectivity remains the key focal point of the BRI, 
many of the BRI-related development activities will be initially geared 
towards building basic infrastructure and improving physical connectiv-
ity. Given that the BRI is China-led, China is expected to ﬁll a large part 
of the infrastructure investment gap to improve regional connectivity, 
and its ﬁnancing initiatives and efforts are expected to have signiﬁcant 
implications for the region, including its own economy. 
First, it is expected that RMB settlement and investment will continue 
to increase in tandem with the expansion in China's trade and invest-
ment in the Belt and Road region in the next few years. Although RMB 
internationalization still depends on progress in ﬁnancial reforms and 
capital account liberalization, the BRI will boost the use of RMB in trade 
settlements and international ﬁnancing. Second, the BRI will help ad-
dress Asia's infrastructure deﬁcit and lift economic and social develop-
ment in the region. The ASEAN member nations are struggling to fund 
major infrastructural projects themselves and unless they mobilize the 
ﬁnance and expertise needed to tackle their infrastructure problems, 
intra-regional trade and growth could suffer due to declining produc-
tivity as a result of underdevelopment.  
Increasing infrastructure spending is a positive development, par-
ticularly in a period of slower global growth. However, the challenges 
in meeting infrastructural needs are manifold. Governments across the 
region need to be much more aggressive by instituting the necessary re-
forms to attract private infrastructural ﬁnancing and deepen their capital 
markets. Countries like the Philippines and Indonesia have increased 
their infrastructure budgets but bureaucratic hurdles and red tape have 
prevented the effective disbursement of full budgets.32 Further, the op-
tion of accessing capital market ﬁnancing may be limited since ASEAN 
countries with the largest funding gaps (such as Indonesia, Philippines 
and Vietnam) have the smallest corporate bond markets. The Asian Bond 
Market Initiative, which hopes to promote bond market integration and 
development across the region, could ideally improve the domestic 
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ﬁnancing mix for infrastructure but underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets 
in some ASEAN economies are an inhibiting factor. 
PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan has suggested that BRI projects 
should utilize local currency borrowing to support large infrastructure 
projects to minimise potential currency mismatch.33 China's efforts to 
sign local currency swap agreements with other countries, promote the 
direct exchange of RMB with various currencies, appoint RMB clearing 
banks offshore and set up the cross-border payment settlement system, 
give it the experience needed to help Belt and Road countries expand 
the use of domestic currencies in infrastructure ﬁnancing. 
Under the BRI, China has a series of arrangements and agreements 
with its Asian neighbours, including the China-Indochina Peninsula 
Economic Corridor (as one of the six Belt and Road economic corridors), 
ASEAN and China Production Capacity Cooperation, and in areas such 
as maritime and port development, connectivity, tourism, health and 
environment, among others. Linkages between China and ASEAN are 
already ﬂourishing on multiple fronts via trade, investment and tourism. 
The BRI is expected to alter the regional economic landscape by further 
enhancing development and connectivity in the future. 
Sarah Chan is a Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National 
University of Singapore. Her research interests include China's economic and 
ﬁnancial developments, as well as East Asian trade and investment. Email: 
eaicsfs@nus.edu.sg
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3  Also known as the New Silk Road, Maritime Silk Road, or One Belt, One Road(OBOR) 
initiative.
4  UOB, 'China: Belt And Road Initiative And What It Means,' 18 May 2017. 
5  Currently, the Asian economies invest US$ 881 billion annually in infrastructure, 
so the estimated funding gap is approximately 2.4 per cent of projected GDP for 
70 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 35(2)•2017
Sarah Chan ________________________________________________________________
2016-2020. Asian Development Bank (2017). 
6  See Bank for International Settlements 2014. Understanding the Challenges for Infra-
structure Finance. BIS Working Papers No. 454. Basel: BIS. Available at  http://www.
bis.org/publ/work454.pdf.
7  McKinsey Global Institute 2016. Bridging Global Infrastructure Gaps. Available at 
http://www.un.org/pga/71/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2017/06/Bridging-
Global-Infrastructure-Gaps-Full-report-June-2016.pdf.
8  See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2015. Infra-
structure Financing Instruments and Incentives. Paris: OECD. Available at http://www.
oecd.org/ﬁnance/private-pensions/Infrastructure-Financing-Instruments-and-In-
centives.pdf. 
9  See OECD 2015.
10  Bhattacharyay B and Bhattacharyay M 2017. Institutional Architecture for Financ-
ing Pan-Asian Infrastructure Connectivity. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6422, 
6 April 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965362.
11  'Full Text of President Xi's Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum', Xinhua, 14 
May 2017. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
12  'Chinese ﬁnancial watchdogs vow support for Belt and Road Initiative', Xinhua 
News, 7 May 2017. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/07/
c_136263130.htm.
13  The Silk Road Fund tends to use a combination of equity (70 per cent) and debt 
instruments (30 per cent) to provide support in four key areas – infrastructure, 
energy, industrial and ﬁnancial cooperation. As of May 2017, the Silk Road Fund 
has initiated ﬁfteen investment projects totalling US$ 6 billion. See 'Lianhe Zaobao, 
'yi dai yi hongli he fengxian' (Risks and Dividends in One Belt, One Road), Singapore: 
SPH Holdings, 14 May 2017.
14   Multilateral development banks have contributed an average of US$ 30-50 billion to 
infrastructure in developing countries in the past decade. They have global expertise 
in infrastructure policy and design to help countries attract private investment. 
McKinsey Global Institute (2016). 'Bridging Global Infrastructure Gaps'. Available 
at http://www.un.org/pga/71/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2017/06/Bridging-
Global-Infrastructure-Gaps-Full-report-June-2016.pdf. 
15  Ehlers, T, F Packer and Eli Remolona 2014. 'Infrastructure and Corporate Bond 
Markets in Asia', conference volume of the 2014 RBA Annual Conference on 'Fi-
nancial Flows and Infrastructure Financing'. Available at https://www.rba.gov.
au/publications/confs/2014/pdf/ehlers-packer-remolona.pdf.
16  Deutsche Bank Research (2016). Asia Infrastructure Financing. Available 
at https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/
PROD0000000000380319/Asia_infrastructure_ﬁnancing%3A_Getting_it_right_
wo.pdf.
17   See OECD 2015.
18  HSBC, 'On the New Silk Road VI: Financing the BRI – where the money is coming 
from', 31 May 2017. 
19  HSBC, 'On the New Silk Road VI: Financing the BRI – where the money is coming 
from', 31 May 2017.  
20  HSBC, 'On the New Silk Road VI: Financing the BRI – where the money is coming 
from', 31 May 2017.
21  'Chinese-funded Silkroad international bank opens in Djibouti', Xinhua, 18 January 
2017. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/18/c_135994459.
htm.
22  HSBC, 'On the New Silk Road VI: Financing the BRI – where the money is coming 
_________________________________________________________________________71
__________________________________________________ The Belt and Road Initiative
from', 31 May 2017. 
23  HSBC, 'On the New Silk Road VI: Financing the BRI – where the money is coming 
from', 31 May 2017. 
24  'Bank of China Raises US$3.55 billion for Silk Road Push', Reuters, 25 June 2017.
25  Green bonds are corporate bonds, project bonds, and sub-sovereign bonds that 
ﬁnance investment in green infrastructure assets such as clean energy. The bonds 
can be issued by development banks, governments, corporations, banks or special 
purpose vehicles as project ﬁnance and asset-backed instruments. 
26  HSBC, 'On the New Silk Road VI: Financing the BRI – where the money is coming 
from', 31 May 2017. 
27  Villafuerte J, Corong E and Zhuang J 2016. The One Belt, One Road Initiative: Impact 
on Trade and Growth. Presented at the 19th Annual Conference on Global Economic 
Analysis, Washington DC, USA. Paper Available at https://www.gtap.agecon.
purdue.edu/resources/download/8280.pdf. 
28  China has also reportedly given a new pledge to cash-starved Laos for the construc-
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Appendix 1
An Overview of Chinese Financing for BRI-related Projects
Institution Role ASEAN Projects
Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank 
(AIIB)
All 10 ASEAN member nations 
are members of AIIB. President Xi 
Jinping has personally encouraged 
AIIB to ''take part in the building 
of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road'' 
Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank
Committed to fund-
ing for Chinese-led 
projects in Indonesia 
Chinese Policy Banks
China Development 
Bank
A policy bank providing medium-
to long term ﬁnancing facilities 
that ''assist in the development of 
a robust economy and a healthy, 
prosperous community''. Active 
across the world in many One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR) projects.
Indonesia, Malaysia
China Exim Bank
A policy bank with the mission 
to facilitate export and import of 
Chinese products and equipment, 
assist Chinese companies' overseas 
investment and promote interna-
tional economic cooperation and 
trade. Active across the world. Has 
pledged more than RMB700 billion 
to 1,200 OBOR projects. 
Agricultural Bank 
of China
(ABC)
A policy bank with the mission 
to promote the development of 
agriculture and rural areas. Much 
less active overseas than the other 
policy banks but there are indica-
tions that the bank may support 
OBOR projects 
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Big four SOE banks 
Bank of China 
Bank president stated in 2015 that 
it would focus overseas activities in 
ASEAN in order to push forward 
the OBOR. The bank has a target of 
channeling US$100 billion to OBOR 
between 2015-18.
Committed funding 
for the Philippines 
ICBC
Bank co-ﬁnanced ﬂagship projects 
in Pakistan alongside other banks 
and the Silk Road Fund. In 2014, 
the bank signed an agreement with 
China Export & Credit Insurance 
Corporation to jointly promote 
OBOR investment, including within 
the Bangladesh-China-India-Myan-
mar Economic Corridor 
Provided US$800 mil-
lion of bridge loans for 
acquisition of Malay-
sian power assets
ABC
Less active overseas than the other 
major banks but its presence is 
growing. The bank has stated that 
one of its priorities in the coming 
years will be to promote Chinese 
companies going out under OBOR. 
China Construction 
Bank 
Bank signed an MOU with Singa-
pore's overseas investment agency 
to invest over US$22.2 billion in 
Singapore to channel the OBOR 
projects 
Funds
Silk Road Fund 
US$40 billion investment fund 
established to support investment 
along the OBOR. Capitalized by 
SAFE (65%), China Investment Cor-
poration (15%), China Exim Bank 
(15%) and CDB (5%). 
China Insurance 
Investment Fund 
Approved by the State Council in 
July 2015. US$48 billion fund will 
be capitalized by Chinese insurance 
companies and will invest in China 
and overseas. According to the 
State Council, it will actively invest 
in OBOR projects. 
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China-ASEAN  
Investment  
Cooperation Fund
US$1 billion fund targeting invest-
ment in infrastructure, energy, 
minerals and agriculture in ASEAN 
countries. The fund was set up 
prior to OBOR is likely to invest in 
various projects. 
Silk Road Gold 
Fund 
Aims to raise US$16 billion within 
5-7 years to invest in gold-related 
business and mining companies 
along the Silk Road. The majority 
of the fund is owned by Shandong 
Gold Group (35%) and Shaanxi 
Gold Group (25%) with the rest 
owned by ﬁnancial institutions. 
Green Ecological 
Silk Road  
Investment Fund 
US$4.8 billion equity fund estab-
lished by a group of private Chi-
nese enterprises. Will focus on solar 
panel construction, clean energy 
and ''ecological remediation'' in 
China and other countries along the 
Silk Road Economic Belt. 
Investment Companies 
CITIC Ltd 
SOE holding company with diversi-
ﬁed investments across the globe. 
Reportedly will invest US$112 
billion alongside OBOR in the next 
decade. 
China Investment 
Corporation
Subsidiary of sovereign wealth 
fund. Plans to raise US$50-100 bil-
lion for overseas investment, with a 
key focus on OBOR countries. Con-
tributed 15% of Silk Road Fund's 
original capital.
China Minsheng 
Investment  
Corporation
Private ﬁnancial investment group. 
Established CMI International 
Holdings in Singapore with initial 
capital of US$5.1 billion to imple-
ment the OBOR agenda. 
Source: HSBC.
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Appendix 2
Major BRI-related projects in selected ASEAN countries
Project Location Sector 
Val-
ue, 
US$ 
bn
Chinese ﬁrm 
involved 
The Philippines 
Cabling manufacturing 
facilities
Telecom 3.0 Suli Group Ltd.
Railway project (MOU) Infra-Transport 2.5
China Railway 
Engineering Corp
Pulangi-5 Hydro Project Infra-Energy 1.0
Power China 
Guizhou 
Engineering Corp
Nationwide Island 
Provinces bridges
Infra-Transport 0.8
Power China, Sino 
Hydro
Davao Coastline Port 
Development Project
Mindanao Infra-Transport 0.8
Steel plant
Heavy 
industry
0.7
Bayin International 
Investment Ltd
Pasig River-Marikina 
River Manggahan 
Floodway Bridges 
Project 
Infra-Transport 0.6 Sino Hydro
Cebu International and 
Bulk Terminal Project
Cebu Infra-Transport 0.3
CCCC Dredging 
Company
Ambal Simuay Sub-
river basin ﬂood control
Infra-Transport 0.3 Sino Hydro
Manufacturing Facility
Heavy 
industry
0.3
Zhuhai Granton 
Bus and Coach 
Company
Steel Manufacturing 
plant
Heavy 
industry
0.2
SIIC Shanghai 
International Trade
Hybrid rice protection 
for two million hectares
Agriculture 0.2
Jiangsu Hongqi 
Seed Co
Manila Harbour Center 
Reclamation Project
Manila Infra-Transport 0.1
China Harbour 
Engineering Co.
EDSA bus program Manila Infra-Transport 0.1
Yangtse Motor 
Group Ltd., 
,Minmetals
Reneweable energy, 
other infra projects
Infra-Energy 0.1
China CAMCE 
Engineering
Banana Plantation 
Project
Agriculture 0.1
Shanghai Xinwo 
Agriculture 
Development
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Appendix 2
Major BRI-related projects in selected ASEAN countries
Project Location Sector 
Val-
ue, 
US$ 
bn
Chinese ﬁrm 
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The Philippines 
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Guizhou 
Engineering Corp
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Hydro
Davao Coastline Port 
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Mindanao Infra-Transport 0.8
Steel plant
Heavy 
industry
0.7
Bayin International 
Investment Ltd
Pasig River-Marikina 
River Manggahan 
Floodway Bridges 
Project 
Infra-Transport 0.6 Sino Hydro
Cebu International and 
Bulk Terminal Project
Cebu Infra-Transport 0.3
CCCC Dredging 
Company
Ambal Simuay Sub-
river basin ﬂood control
Infra-Transport 0.3 Sino Hydro
Manufacturing Facility
Heavy 
industry
0.3
Zhuhai Granton 
Bus and Coach 
Company
Steel Manufacturing 
plant
Heavy 
industry
0.2
SIIC Shanghai 
International Trade
Hybrid rice protection 
for two million hectares
Agriculture 0.2
Jiangsu Hongqi 
Seed Co
Manila Harbour Center 
Reclamation Project
Manila Infra-Transport 0.1
China Harbour 
Engineering Co.
EDSA bus program Manila Infra-Transport 0.1
Yangtse Motor 
Group Ltd., 
,Minmetals
Reneweable energy, 
other infra projects
Infra-Energy 0.1
China CAMCE 
Engineering
Banana Plantation 
Project
Agriculture 0.1
Shanghai Xinwo 
Agriculture 
Development
Reneweable energy 
projects
Infra-Energy 0.3
TBEA Xinjing 
Sunoasis;
Subic-Clark railway 
project
Subic Infra-Transport 0.2
China Harbour 
Engineering
BGC-NAII segment of 
Rapid Bus Transit
Infra-Transport 0.1
China Road and 
Bridge Corp
Real Estate project
Other infra/
real estate
0.1 China Fortune Land
Safe and Smart City 
Projects
Other infra/
real estate
0.1
Huawei 
Technologies
Transportation and 
logistics infrastructure 
at Sangley Point
Infra-Transport 0.0
China Harbour 
Engineering
North Negros biomass 
and South Negros 
biomass project
North 
Negros
Agriculture 0.0
Wuxi Huaguang 
Electric Power
Hotel room capacity 
expansion
Other infra/
real estate
0.0
Manila Flood 
Management Project
Manila Infra-Transport 0.5
Total 12.4
Indonesia
Jakarta-Bandung Rail Java Infra-Transport 5.1
China Railway 
International (40% 
stake)
Cement plant
South 
Sulawesi
Heavy 
industry
0.3
Anhui Conch 
Cement Company 
Cisumdawu Toll Road Java Infra-Transport 0.3
Manado-Bitung Toll 
Road
North 
Sulawesi
Infra-Transport 0.4
Samarinda-Balikpapan 
Toll road
Kalimantan Infra-Transport 0.9
Hydropower plant 
(7,000 MW)
Kalimantan Infra-Energy 17.0
China Power 
Investment 
Corporation
National Slum 
Upgrading Project
Infra-Transport 1.7
Dam operational 
improvement safety 
project
Infra-Energy 0.1
Regional Infrastructure 
Development Fund 
Project
Infra-Transport 0.4
Total 26.2
Malaysia 
East Coast Rail Line 
(ECRL)
West 
Malaysia
Infra-Transport 17.7
China 
Communications 
Company Limited
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Melaka Gateway Project Malacca
Other infra/
real estate
10.8 Powerchina
Melaka Gateway Port Malacca Infra-Transport 2.0
PowerChina, 
Shenzhen Yantian 
Port, Rizhao Port
Sarawak Steel Plant
Bintulu, 
Sarawak
Heavy 
industry
3.3
Hebei Xinwuan 
Steel Group
Solar Ingots Plant Sarawak
Heavy 
industry
0.3
Comtec Solar 
Systems Group Ltd.
Power Plant Deal Sarawak Infra-Energy 0.1
China Machinery 
Engineering Corp
Malaysia-China 
Kuantan Industrial Park
Kuantan Manufacturing 3.8
Wuxi Suntech; 
Guangxi Investment 
Group; LJ Hightech 
Material
Kuantan Port Kuantan Infra-Transport 0.3
Guangxi Beibu Gulf 
International Port 
Group (40%)
Green Technology Park Pekan Manufacturing 0.5
China Nuclear 
Industry Huaxing 
Construction
Trans-Sabah gas 
pipeline
Sabah Infra-Energy 0.1
China Petroleum 
Pipeline Bureau
Petrochemical plant Sabah
Heavy 
industry
0.3
Complant, 
Sichuan Chemical 
Industry Holding, 
China Chengda 
Engineering
Robotic Future City Johor Bahru Manufacturing 3.5
Total 42.7
Source: Public sources, HSBC.
